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We study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output 
from the match is uncertain ex ante, there may exist a discriminatory equilibrium where 
workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a 
bad match takes place, discriminated workers will use longer time to find another job, 
prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for the firms to hire the 
discriminated workers, thus sustaining discrimination. In contrast to standard models, the 
existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to 
discriminate also for firms without discriminatory preferences. 
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Can discrimination of a group of workers persist if there are proﬁt maximizing
employers with no "taste for discrimination"? In Becker’s (1957) model, discrim-
ination is explained by prejudices or tastes among some employers. However, the
existence of prejudices against one group of workers will lead to lower wages for
this group, making them more proﬁtable to hire for other employers, without prej-
udices. As argued by Arrow (1973), the employers without prejudices will proﬁt
from hiring the discriminated group at lower wages, and may ultimately drive the
prejudiced employers out of the market.
The key mechanism of Becker’s argument is that discriminated workers become
more attractive to hire for other, non-discriminatory ﬁrms. We argue that there
is a mechanism working in the opposite direction, which in important cases makes
discriminated workers less attractive for other ﬁrms. There will always be uncer-
tainty as to the productivity of a new worker-ﬁrm match, and the worker may
turn out to be less productive in the job than was expected in advance. This is
a disadvantage for both parties, the ﬁrm receiving lower output, and the worker
often receiving lower wages. Thus, if a bad match occurs, both parties will want
to terminate the relationship so as to ﬁnd a partner that suits better. However,
if the worker is in a discriminated group, it may be diﬃcult for him/her to ﬁnd
another job. If there in addition is employment protection legislation making it
costly or diﬃcult for the employer to lay oﬀ the worker, the worker may remain
in the low productive match for a long time, leading to a loss for the employer.
T h eu p s h o ti st h a ti ti sl e s sp r o ﬁtable to hire an individual from a discriminated
group, precisely because the individual is from this group.
The crucial assumption and source of discrimination in our model is the exis-
tence of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) that is suﬃciently strict that
it constrains ﬁrms’ layoﬀ decisions. Most OECD countries have extensive EPL,
see overview in OECD (2004), and a large literature has documented that EPL
aﬀects important economic variables, such as unemployment, wages, hiring and
ﬁring rates, and investments in human capital (e.g., Addison and Teixeira, 2003;
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Garibaldi and Violante, 2005; Hopenhayn and Roger-
1son, 1993, Saint-Paul; 1996, OECD, 2004). Even in the US, which are among the
OECD countries with least strict EPL, there is evidence that it aﬀects employment
rates of some groups in the labor market (Autor, Donahue and Schwab, 2006).
There is a considerable literature studying whether EPL aimed at protecting
speciﬁcg r o u p sm a yh a v en e g a t i v ee ﬀects on the employment level of these groups.
Behaghel, Crépon and Sédillot (2008) study the eﬀect of the Delalande tax in
France, upon which ﬁrms laying oﬀ workers aged 50 and above have to pay a tax
to the unemployment insurance system. Behaghel et al show that the legislative
change in 1992, which stated that the tax does not apply if workers are hired after
the age 50, led to a signiﬁcant increase in the hiring probability of the unemployed
a g e d5 0a n da b o v e ,a sc o m p a r e dt ou n e m p l o y e di nt h el a t e4 0 s ,c o n s i s t e n tw i t h
the notion that the risk of paying the tax deterred ﬁrms from hiring unemployed
workers in the late 40s. Several papers study the eﬀect of the enforcement of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which among other things prohibit
discriminatory discharge on the basis of disability, see. e.g. DeLeire (2000) and
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). Acemoglu and Angrist, using data from the Cur-
rent Population Survey, show that there was a sharp drop in the employment of
disabled individuals after the ADA went into eﬀect. However, while our paper
shares the idea that possible future ﬁring costs may aﬀect ﬁrms’ hiring decisions,
ak e yd i ﬀerence is that we show that this mechanism may explain persistent dis-
criminatory outcomes also for workers with the same productive characteristics as
other workers.
Our model constitutes a novel explanation for the existence of persistent dis-
crimination of a group of workers with identical productive characteristics, which
applies in the case where it is costly or diﬃcult for employers to lay oﬀ workers.
W ea r eh o w e v e rn o tt h eﬁrst to provide explanations for the existence of persistent
discrimination of ex-ante identical groups, in the absence of preferences for dis-
crimination. One strand of this literature is based on investment in human capital.
The idea is that discrimination against one group of workers reduces their incentive
to invest in human capital. This in turn makes the employers’ initial perception of
productive diﬀerences self-fulﬁlling. (See e.g., Arrow, 1973; Lundberg and Startz,
1983; Coate and Loury, 1993; Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked, 2000). Another
approach puts forward the idea that employers ﬁnd it easier to assess or mentor
2workers from their own group. (Cornell and Welch; 1996, Athey, Avery and Zem-
sky; 2000). In contrast to these papers, we obtain persistent discrimination of a
group that has identical productive characteristics even at the hiring stage, and
without any information asymmetries or diﬀerences between the groups. As in
this paper, Rosén (1997) and Masters (2006) use a search framework and derive
equilibrium discrimination as the result of the interaction between the ﬁrms’ hiring
policies. Yet Rosén (1997) and Masters (2006) build on asymmetric information,
while our explanation is based on symmetric information, and the combination of
on-the-job search and ﬁring costs is the source of a discriminatory outcome.1
In the main part of our paper we analyse how discrimination can result even
for a group that is identical to others in production sense, and without any inher-
ent tastes or preferences against the discriminated group. Clearly, in this setting
there also exists a neutral equilibrium, with no discrimination. Thus, our model
does not predict that discrimination is inevitable. However, as there is evidence
supporting the existence of taste-based discrimination (e.g. Charles and Guryan,
2008), we also explore the implications of this in our model. We show that if a
suﬃciently large share of the employers discriminate as a result of discriminatory
preferences, it becomes unproﬁtable to hire the discriminated group, so that also
pure proﬁt-maximizing employers, without discriminatory preferences, will prac-
tice discriminatory hiring. The upshot is that the neutral equilibrium vanishes,
while the discriminatory equilibrium still exists. Note also that if the economy is
in a discriminatory equilibrium because a suﬃciently large share of the employers
have a taste for discrimination, the discrimininatory equilibrium will prevail also if
preferences change over time so that all employers become pure proﬁt maximisers.
To move from the discriminatory equilibrium to the neutral, some form of discrete
change or concerted action is needed.
The aim of the paper is to make a theoretical point that discrimination is pos-
sible even for workers with identical productive characteristics. Thus, we do not
try to accommodate the model to the diﬀerences in productive characteristics that
describes most groups that are discriminated in the labor market. However, in
1Lang et al. (2005) show within an urn-ball search model that wages and utility of the
discriminated group are substantially lower with an arbitrary small taste for discrimination.
Other papers that considers search and taste-based discrimination include Black (1995), Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002) and Rosén (2003).
3section 7 we nevertheless show that several predictions that can be drawn from
the model are consistent with the labor market situation of immigrants in many
European countries. Immigrants are much more likely than native-born to have
temporary jobs, and they are more likely to exit from temporary help agencies into
other sectors of activity, consistent with the idea that ﬁrms are reluctant to hire
immigrants in permanent jobs without trying them ﬁrst. In particular, the model
may be relevant for Nordic labour markets. In spite of extensive measures to help
immigrants entering the labour market, high unemployment rates and overqualiﬁ-
cation remain important problems for immigrants in the Nordic countries. In the
Economic Survey of Sweden 2007, one of the key elements to combat exclusion
is "to reduce the risk associated with hiring someone who turns out not to be
the right person for the job" (OECD, 2007a), consistent with the key source of
discrimination in our model.
Our model is related to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), who also consider a
sequential search model where the productivity of a speciﬁc match is uncertain.
Furthermore, the model shares features with Saint-Paul (1995), notably the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria and a positive relationship between ﬁrms’ proﬁta n d
the likelihood that the worker leaves in case of a bad match. However, neither of
these papers mention possible implications for discrimination.
The paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in Section 2, while
in Section 3, we consider the existence of a discriminatory equilibrium. Section 4
explores the eﬀects of some employers having discriminatory preferences, alterna-
tively follow a form of aﬃrmative action to combat discrimination. In section 5, we
consider the eﬀect of an alternative modelling of the wage setting, where the wage
outcome is also aﬀected by outside opportunities. In addition, we report results
from numerical simulations of the model. Section 6 explores the robustness of the
discriminatory equilibrium. Among other things, we explore the possibility that
workers in the discriminated group may "buy a job" by accepting a very low or
even negative wage during an initial hiring stage. Section 7 compares the empirical
implications to existing empirical literature. Section 8 concludes.
42 The model
We consider a sequential search model of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides type
with wages set by bargaining2.T h e r ea r et w ot y p e so fw o r k e r si nt h ee c o n o m y ,nG
Greens and nR Reds, where nG+nR =1 . Workers are ex-ante equally productive,
and there is no other diﬀerence between the types than some observable character-
istic that determines the type, e.g. the color of the skin. There is free entry of jobs
in the market, and ﬁrms may open a vacancy by incurring a cost K>0.T h e s e
costs could e.g. be thought of as investment in relevant physical capital, and are
once-for all costs. As will become apparent below, these costs are important for
ensuring that a low productivity match involves a loss for the ﬁr m ,e v e ni nt h ec a s e
where the wage is determined by a sharing of the revenue from the match. The
ﬂow cost of maintaining a vacancy is c ≥ 0. All vacancies are identical. However,
when a ﬁrm has hired a worker, a random draw determines whether the match is
of high or low productivity, with output yH >y L > 0, respectively.
There are three key assumptions in the paper. First, we assume that it is costly
for ﬁrms to lay oﬀ a worker who wants to remain in the job. In many countries, such
costs come in the form of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). To simplify
the exposition, we consider the extreme case where lay oﬀ costs are suﬃciently high
that ﬁrms will never proﬁtf r o ml a y i n go ﬀ a worker. In the numerical simulations
we show that standard assumptions regarding the size of the ﬁring costs may be
suﬃcient for this to be the case.
Second, we assume that only some of the uncertainty about the match-speciﬁc
productivity is revealed when the employer and worker meet. In the words of Pries
and Rogerson (2005), match quality is both an inspection good and an experience
good.3 Speciﬁcally, when a ﬁrm is matched with a worker, both parties observe a
signal γ that corresponds to the probability that the match is of high productivity.
The parameter γ is i.i.d. over matches and to keep the model transparent, may
take only two values: γ with probability η and γ < γ with probability 1 − η.4
2Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985).
3T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fm a t c h - s p e c i ﬁc uncertainty is supported by Nagypal (2007), who present
evidence from French ﬁrm level data showing that the eﬀect of learning about match quality
dominates the eﬀect of learning by doing at tenures above six months.
4In a previous version of the paper, numerical simulations show the existence of a discrimi-
5Having observed γ,t h eﬁrm decides whether to oﬀer the worker a job, and the
worker decides whether to accept the oﬀer. The idea is that when the ﬁrm and
the worker meet, they will obtain information that makes it possible to assess the
likelihood that the match will be of high quality, but they can not foresee perfectly
how the worker will perform. There is considerable uncertainty as to both how
well the worker ﬁts in with the job requirements, and to how she/he ﬁts in with the
colleagues. Furthermore, the productivity of the match may also change over time.
For example, the job requirements may change, implying that a previously well
qualiﬁed worker becomes less productive. To keep the model as simple as possible,
we assume that the match productivity is revealed immediately after the worker
is hired, for then to be constant over time.5 Crucially, employment protection is
already at work at the time when match productivity is revealed, so that ﬁrms
cannot ﬁre costlessly upon discovering that productivity is low.6
T h i r d ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h ee m p l o y e ra n dt h ee m p l o y e es h a r et h eb e n e ﬁts from
the match being of high productivity. In the model, this is captured by the as-
sumption that the wage is increasing in the output in the job, which is the standard
assumption in search models.
W o r k e r sa r ea s s u m e dt ol e a v et h em a r k e ta ta ne x o g e n o u sr a t es, and new work-
ers enter as unemployed at the same rate. Assuming small, but strictly positive
search costs, workers in high productivity matches will not search, since all high-
productivity matches are equal. However, all unemployed workers will gain from
searching, and so will workers in low productivity matches. For simplicity, search
intensity is assumed to be exogenous and the same for employed and unemployed
workers. The matching between vacancies and workers is random, independent of
worker type, and described by a Cobb-Douglas matching function
natory equilibrium in a similar model with a continuum of types of workers.
5The same results could derived under the alternative assumption that all matches start out
with high productivity, combined with a constant probability rate that productivity falls to a
lower level. However, the analysis would be more cumbersome.
6In many cases, worker turnover is costly to the ﬁrm, see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
which might make discriminated workers more attractive and go against our results. However,
when exploring the eﬀects of EPL, it seems reasonable to focus on the possibility of mismatch
where ﬁrms want a separation to happen.
6X = A(u + ε(1 − u))
λv
1−λ, 0 <λ<1, (1)
where X is the number of matches taking place as a function of the vacancy rate
v a n dt h er a t eo fj o ba p p l i c a n t su + ε(1 − u),w h e r eu is the unemployment rate
and ε i st h ef r a c t i o no fe m p l o y e dw o r k e r sw h oa r ei nb a dm a t c h e sa n dt h u ss e a r c h .
The parameter A indicates the eﬃciency or speed of the matching process. The
rate at which a vacancy is matched to a job seeker is q = X/v, labour market
tightness (the ratio of vacancies to job-seekers) is θ = v/(u + ε(1 − u)) and the
rate at which a job-seeker is matched to a vacancy is φ = θq.
2.1 Value functions
Workers’ ﬂow payoﬀ is equal to their wage, w,w h e ne m p l o y e da n de q u a lt oz when
unemployed. The asset value of an unemployed worker of type i, i = G,R is:
(r + s)Ui = z + φpi(EWi(γ) − Ui), (2)
where r is discount rate, φ is the matching rate for a worker who search, pi is the
probability that a worker of type i is hired, conditional on being matched with a
vacancy, E is the expectation operator, taken over the stochastic variable γ, while
Wi(γ) is the asset value of worker of type i who has just been hired, after observing




i +( 1− γ)W
L
i , (3)
where superscript indicate the productivity level of the match. As workers in a







i is the wage in a high productive match for a worker of type i. In contrast,
a worker in a low productivity match, earning the wage wL
i , will continue to search.
As noted above, we assume that due to EPL, the ﬁrm is not allowed, or ﬁnd it
7too costly, to lay oﬀ the worker even if the match is of low productivity. The asset














r + s + φpi
. (6)
Likewise, for the ﬁrms, the asset value of a job ﬁlled with a worker of type i,
in a match of high productivity, denoted JH
































i +( s + φpi)V
r + s + φpi
. (8)
The value to a ﬁrm of hiring a worker from group i after having observed γ is
γJH
i +( 1− γ)JL
i . Using (7) and (8), we ﬁnd the value to the ﬁrm of hiring a
worker from group i as a function of the probability that the match is of high
productivity, γ, and the probability that, in case of a low productivity match, the
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i it follows that Ji(γ,pi) is strictly increasing in γ.A s ﬁrms hire a
worker iﬀ it is proﬁtable, (if Ji >V ) ﬁrms will choose a cut-oﬀ rule for each type
γC
i , w h e r et h e yh i r ei ﬀ γ ≥ γC
i . Let μ(γC) denote the proportion of applicants that
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Then consider the wage setting, which takes place immediately after the match
productivity is revealed. In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r ,w et a k el i t e r a l l yt h ea s -
sumption that the EPL is suﬃciently strict to prevent any involuntary layoﬀs,
implying that the outside options are not the relevant threat points in a dispute
over the wage.7 In line with Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), the threats
points should then reﬂect the players’ payoﬀs during a dispute in the bargaining.
We assume that in this case no production takes place while the ﬁrm does not
pay any wages to the worker; for simplicity the threat points of both players are
then set to zero. According to Binmore et al (1986), the bargaining power of the
worker, β ∈ (0,1) should reﬂect players’ time preferences, and these are assumed
t ob et h es a m ef o rb o t hg r o u p s .T h u s ,t h ew a g ew i l lb et h es a m ef o rb o t hw o r k e r




7This follows the outside option principle of Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989), by which
the outside options work as constraints on the bargaining outcome, and not as threat points. See
Hall and Milgrom (2008) for a similar argument. In section 5 below, we consider the case where
the wage is also aﬀected by outside opportunities, implying that the discriminated group obtains
lower wages in equilibrium.




We want to explore a situation where EPL bites, in the sense that it prevents
ﬁrms from laying oﬀ workers. To ensure this, we assume that ﬁrms want to get
rid of workers in a low productivity match, i.e. that
(1 − β)y
L <r V . (14)
The crucial assumption here is that if the match has low productivity, this is costly
to the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm cannot avoid these costs by cutting the wage.
2.2 Equilibrium
We consider an equilibrium where all ﬁrms use the same hiring strategies; below,
we will show that this is indeed the case.
Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state equilibrium of the economy is a list θ,Ji,W i,U i,V,w H,
wL,α i,ε i,u i,such that the following conditions hold:
First, free entry ensures that the value of a vacancy is equal to the cost of
opening a vacancy:
V = K,
with V given by (11). Second, ﬁr m sh i r eaw o r k e ro ft y p ei iﬀ it is proﬁtable.
Ji(γ,pi) = V for γ = γ
C
i Ji(γ,pi) <V for γ<γ
C
i
with Ji(γ,pi) given by (9). Third, workers’ behavior must be optimal. This implies
that only unemployed or workers in low productivity matches search, and they
accept all job oﬀers. Finally, the steady state conditions (15), (16) and (17) must
all be fulﬁlled.8
8See derivation in Appendix 1.
10In steady state, the share of employed workers of type i in jobs with low match
quality, εi is given by
εi =
s(1 − E(γ |γ ≥ γc
i))
s + E(γ |γ ≥ γc
i) φpi
. (15)





The fraction of all job seekers, both unemployed and employed in low productivity
matches, that are of type i, αi,i s
αi =
ni(ui +( 1− ui)εi)
nG(uG +( 1− uG)εG)+nR(uR +( 1− uR)εR)
. (17)
3 Discriminatory equilibrium
In this section we establish the existence of at least one equilibrium in the model.
Furthermore, we consider existence of a discriminatory equilibrium, where all ﬁrms
hire Greens irrespective of the value of the signal γ, but where Reds are hired only
if γ = γ.
In a discriminatory equilibrium, all ﬁr m su s et h es a m eh i r i n gs t r a t e g yw h e r e
γC
G = γ,a n dγC
R = γ.W et h e nh a v et h a tE(JG
¯ ¯γ ≥ γ)=JG(γM,1) (where γM is
the expected value of γ), E(JR |γ ≥ γ)=JR(γ,η), μ(γC
G)=1 , μ(γC
R)=η , pG =1 ,







r + q(θ)(αG + αRη)
. (18)
T or u l eo u ta no u t c o m ew h e r en oﬁrm enters, we assume that the economy is
productive, also with discrimininatory hiring rules.
Assumption 1: V (θ) >Kfor θ =0 , given γC
G = γ,a n dγC
R = γ.









(See Appendix 2). Note that for any γ ≥ 0 there exist values of yH such that (19)
is satisﬁed. Assumption 1 says that the value of vacancy is greater than K when
θ =0 , given the hiring rules γG = γ and γR = γ. H o w e v e r ,t h e r ei sn or e q u i r e m e n t
that the hiring rules are optimal at θ =0 .
In the typical search model the value of a vacancy is decreasing in θ, implying
that if the economy is productive, then there also exist an equilibrium. In contrast,
in our model the value of a vacancy, V , may be increasing in θ for some parameter
values, as JG and JR are increasing in the workers’ matching rate φ.H o w e v e r ,t h e






is decreasing in θ and V< Kfor θ>θ
1.
Lemma 1 There exists values θ
0 and θ
1such that dV







for θ = θ
0,V(θ
1)=0and V (θ) < 0 for θ>θ
1.
Pr o o f .See Appendix 3
Although it is possible that V is increasing in θ for some parameters, we will
only consider equilibria where dV
dθ < 0, and the above Lemma establishes that such
a region exists.
We now turn to the speciﬁc conditions for existence of discriminatory equilibria.
In a discriminatory equilibrium a Red worker that is matched to a ﬁrm is only hired
if γ = γ, which happens with probability pR = η. This requires that the expected
proﬁts for the ﬁrm of hiring a Red worker with a low signal γ = γ is less or equal





H + sV )+
(1 − γ)
(r + s + φη)
¡
(1 − β)y




where we have used (9) and substituted out for the wage equations (12) and
(13). Note that the expected proﬁts from hiring a worker only depends on the
12probability that the match has high output,γ, and the probability that the worker
is hired when being matched with another ﬁrm. Thus, we may omit the subscript
indicating worker type.
In addition, the existence of a discriminatory equilibrium requires that it is
proﬁt a b l et oh i r eaG r e e nw i t hγ = γ, given that all other ﬁr m sa l w a y sh i r e






H + sV )+
(1 − γ)
r + s + φ
¡
(1 − β)y
L +( s + φ)V
¢
>V . (21)
As V = K in equilibrium, a discriminatory equilibrium thus requires that J(γ,η) <
K<J (γ,1).
Depending on the parameter values, the model may give rise to a several dif-
ferent trivial equilibria. For low enough values of K,i ti sp r o ﬁtable to hire both
type of workers irrespective of the signal that is observed. Correspondingly, for K
being suﬃciently high, ﬁrms will never hire workers with a bad signal, irrespective
of type. Likewise, if the bad signal is not so bad, i.e. γ quite high, it will be prof-
itable to hire a worker with γ = γ even when pR = η, implying that discrimination
cannot take place in equilibrium. Conversely, if the bad signal is really bad, i.e. γ
suﬃciently low, it will not be proﬁt a b l et oh i r eaw o r k e rw i t hγ = γ even if pG =1 .
To explore the possibility of a discriminatory equilibrium, we must consequently
consider parameter values which allow ﬁr m st oh i r es o m eb u tn o tn e c e s s a r i l ya l l
applicants. This requires that γ and K take "intermediate" values. Formally, we
assume
Assumption 2: γ ∈
£
γ0,γ1¤
and K ∈ [K0,K1].
The bounds γ0 , γ1 K0 and K1 are deﬁned in Appendix 4. Under these assump-
tions, a discriminatory equilibrium will exist
Proposition 1 Given Assumptions 1 and 2 a discriminatory equilibrium exists.
Pr o o f .See Appendix 4
Thus, with γ and K taking intermediate values, there exist an equilibrium
where ﬁrms hire Green workers irrespective of signal, while Red workers are only
13hired when observing a good signal. As explained above, the reason why it is
unproﬁtable to hire Red workers with a bad signal, is precisely because other ﬁrms
do not hire Red workers with a bad signal. This makes it more diﬃcult for Red
workers to ﬁnd a new job, making them stay longer in a low productive match,
thus involving a cost to the ﬁrm.
If a discriminatory equilibrium exists, then there also exists a neutral equilib-
rium where γC
G = γC
R = γ, i.e. where both type of workers are hired irrespective of
the value of the signal γ that is observed.
Lemma 2 Given Assumptions 1 and 2 a neutral equilibrium exists.
Pr o o f .See Appendix 5
To understand the intuition, ﬁrst observe that Lemma 2 would hold trivially
if labor market tightness θ were given. Clearly, if it is proﬁtable to always hire
a Green worker when all other ﬁrms do to same, then the same must be true
with a Red workers, as Red and Green workers are identical apart from the type.
However, θ i sn o tg i v e n ,s ow em u s tt a k et h ee ﬀect of a change in θ into account. In
a neutral equilibrium, the probability that a badly matched worker ﬁnds another
job is higher than in a discriminatory equilibrium. This raises the value of hiring
a worker, thus raising the value of a vacancy, and consequently leading to an
increase in θ in equilibrium. This again leads to an increase φ (in the rate at
which a searching worker meets a ﬁrm), making it even more proﬁtable to hire a
worker with a bad signal. From the same argument it also follows directly that
the neutral equilibrium Pareto dominates the discriminatory equilibrium.
Note that both equilibria are stable: if one ﬁrm deviates from the equilibrium
hiring strategy, it will have "very small" impact on the probability that a worker
of type i is hired, conditional on being matched, pi. Thus, the equilibrium strategy
will still be optimal for other ﬁrms.
144 Taste for discrimination and aﬃrmative action
In the model so far, there is a multiplicity of equilibria, due to the externality that
the optimal hiring rule for proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms depends on the hiring rules of
other ﬁrms. The multiplicity implies that discrimination is not inevitable, as both
a neutral and a discriminatory equilibrium exist. Thus, in some sense the model
does not explain why there is discrimination, only that discrimination may take
place. However, there are also circumstances which rule out one of the alternatives,
giving rise to clearer predictions from the model.
One such circumstance is if some ﬁrms are not proﬁt maximisers, but rather
are inﬂuenced by other considerations, like discriminatory preferences or anti-
discrimination in the form of aﬃrmative action. Consider ﬁrst the situation
where some ﬁr m sh a v eat a s t ef o rd i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,c o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ee v i d e n c e
that some employers do indeed have prejudices against some groups of workers,
see e.g. Charles and Guryan (2008). More speciﬁcally, assume that a proportion
m ∈ (0,1) of the vacancies for exogenous reasons always apply the discriminatory
hiring rule: γC
G = γ and γC
R = γ.T h u s ,t h e s eﬁrms are willing to hire Red work-
ers if they observe a good signal, but not with a bad. Such behavior could arise
from these employers receiving a certain disutility from hiring Red workers, as
in Becker’s model. However, for simplicity, we do not include any such disutility
explicitly in the model. Furthermore, while the free entry of proﬁt maximising
ﬁrms ensures that the value of a vacancy for these ﬁrms is zero in equilibrium,
we have no similar restriction on the value of a vacancy for the discriminatory
ﬁrms, as their existence is taken as exogenous. The focus is not the behavior of
the discriminatory ﬁrms, but how the existence of the discriminatory ﬁrms aﬀect
t h eb e h a v i o u ro ft h ep r o ﬁt maximising ﬁrms. According to Becker’s argument, the
existence of some discriminatory ﬁrms makes it proﬁtable for non-discriminatory
ﬁrms to hire the workers that are discriminated. We shall explore if this is really
t h ec a s ei no u rm o d e l .
If the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms apply the neutral hiring rule γC
G = γC
R = γ,t h e
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, (22)
where pR =1− m + mη. We can show the following result.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical value ˜ m ∈ (0,1), given by JR(γ,p R)=K
in (22), such that for m>˜ m an equilibrium where proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms apply
the neutral hiring rule γC
G = γC
R = γ does not exist, while the discriminatory
equilibrium where they apply γC
G = γ,γC
R = γ does exist.
Pr o o f .See Appendix 6.
Thus, we observe that the existence of ﬁrms with taste for discrimination has
the opposite eﬀect of what it has in Becker’s model: neutral (non-discriminatory)
behavior becomes less proﬁtable. If there are only a few discriminatory ﬁrms,
and the other ﬁrms have a neutral hiring strategy, the discriminatory ﬁrms earn
al o w e rp r o ﬁt. However, if the share of discriminatory ﬁr m si sa b o v et h ec r i t i c a l
value ˜ m, then it is neutral hiring that is less proﬁtable. Thus, in this case it is the
non-discriminatory hiring that is driven out of the market, and proﬁt maximising
ﬁrms without any taste for discrimination will have the same discriminatory hiring
rule as the ﬁrms with taste for discrimination.9 As both types of ﬁrms apply the
same hiring rule, they also make the same proﬁts.
Next we consider how the outcome is aﬀected by aﬃrmative action. In many
countries, the authorities undertake various measures to reduce the extent of dis-
crimination. One key measure is aﬃrmative action in the form a hiring quotas,
where ﬁrms are required to let a certain proportion of their hirings be from speciﬁc
discriminatory groups, see a discussion of the US experience in Holzer (2007). This
measure is controversial, and it is sometimes argued that it may be counterpro-
ductive. While hiring quotas work to reduce discrimination within the model of
Athey et al (2000), it may have the opposite eﬀect if discrimination is sustained
via the discriminated group investing less in human capital due to the discrimi-
nation, as suggested by Coate and Loury (1993). The reason is that aﬃrmative
9In the numerical simulations below, we show the same qualitative result also when the wage
depends on the outside option, implying that Red workers have lower wages than Green.
16action may ensure that the discriminated group get jobs even with less investment
in human capital, which may reduce their incentives to invest, thus amplifying the
underinvestment. It is thus of interest to see how aﬃrmative action works with
our explanation of discrimination.
We capture the aﬃrmative action by assuming that a proportion a of vacancies
always apply the neutral hiring rule: γC
G = γC
R = γ. One interpretation of this
is that the aﬃrmative action only applies to a part of the labor market, but here
ﬁrms hire according to the share of each group among the applicants. With this
speciﬁcation, the aﬃrmative action case is the mirror image of the case with taste
for discrimination above. Thus the next Corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 1 There exists a critical value ˜ a ∈ (0,1), given by JR(γ,p R)=K in
(22),when pR = a +( 1− a)η, such that for a>˜ a an equilibrium where proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms apply the discriminatory hiring rule γC
G = γ,γC
R = γ does not
exist, while the neutral equilibrium where they apply the neutral hiring rule γC
G =
γC
R = γ does exist.
Thus, we see that in our model, aﬃrmative action in the form of minimum
hiring quotas works to counteract discrimination. The underlying source of dis-
crimination is that the discriminated group have a low job ﬁnding probability, and
thus are less attractive given the uncertainty in match speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t y . A f -
ﬁrmative action increases the job ﬁnding probability of the discriminated group,
making them more attractive to hire. In other words, within this model aﬃrmative
action in some ﬁrms counteracts discriminatory behavior also in jobs that are not
directly aﬀected by the aﬃrmative action rule.
T h et h i r dp o i n tw ew i l lc o n s i d e ri nt h i ss e c t i o ni st h ee ﬀect of the recent history.
Consider a labor market where discrimination has prevailed historically, for reasons
of taste and power, and where discrimination was also a part of the legislation.
Then assume that the discriminatory legislation is removed, and over time also the
taste for discrimination gradually vanishes, in the sense that more and more ﬁrms
become pure proﬁt maximisers, without any preference for worker types. However,
when the ﬁrst ﬁrms loose their taste for discrimination, they still know that other
ﬁrms have a discriminatory hiring strategy. Thus, it will still be optimal for the
proﬁt maximising ﬁrms to continue with the discriminatory hiring. Consequently,
17the discriminatory equilibrium prevails, in spite of the removal of discriminatory
legislation, and even if all ﬁrms lose their taste for discrimination. To get out
of a discriminatory equilibrium, some sort of concerted action would be required,
ensuring that ﬁrms hired discriminated workers even if it was not proﬁtable, or
ensuring changes so that it becomes proﬁtable to hire discriminated workers. This
line of argument is consistent with descriptions of the evolution of racial segregation
in the US labor market given by Darity and Mason (1998), who argued that
discriminatory practices were sustained long after any legal support was removed.
5 Outside opportunities aﬀect bargaining
So far, we have assumed that the wage only depends on the productivity of the
match, and not on the outside alternatives of the workers. We now consider an
a l t e r n a t i v ew a g es e t t i n gm e c h a n i s m ,w h e r et h ew a g ei sa l s oa ﬀected by the players’
outside options. The upshot is that the weaker outside alternatives of the Red
workers lead them to have a lower wage. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the wage
in a high productive match, when y = yH, maximizes the Nash product of each





H − V )
1−β. (23)
In line with the non-cooperative interpretation of Binmore et al (1986), (23) is the
appropriate speciﬁcation if there is a certain probability that the wage bargaining
breaks down, leading the parties to separate so that both receive their outside
options. As the worker in this case leaves voluntarily from the ﬁrm, no ﬁring costs
18has to be paid, implying that the ﬁring costs do not enter the wage setting.10 11The
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. (25)
For workers in a low productive match, we now assume that there is a binding
minimum wage wL satisfying (14), i.e. ensuring that it is not proﬁtable for the
ﬁrm to continue the match. Without this assumption, a wage rule like (24) would
ensure that even low productive matches were proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. Thus, in this
case EPL would be irrelevant, as the ﬁrm would never want to lay oﬀ aw o r k e r ,
implying trivially that no discriminatory equilibrium may exist.
We shall analyse whether the discriminatory equilibrium derived above, where
all Greens are hired, while Reds are only hired if γ = γ, still may exist. And, if
so, under which circumstances.
There are now two opposing mechanisms at work in a discriminatory equilib-
rium. On the one hand, Red workers still have the disadvantage that they are less
likely to ﬁnd another job, implying that the expected duration of a low productive
match is longer. On the other hand, the weaker outside option of Red workers
imply that their wage is lower. If the latter eﬀect is stronger, ﬁrms will prefer
10It is more common to include ﬁring costs in the Nash Product, in which case it also aﬀects
the wage outcome, cf. e.g. Pissarides (2000). This would be appropriate for any costs incurred
by the ﬁrm even in the case when the worker leaves voluntarily, which could be used as a threat
by the worker to push up wages. However, most ﬁring costs are not of this type. For example,
for a professor with tenure, the ﬁring costs could be very large, in the sense that it would be very
costly for the university to lay oﬀ t h ep r o f e s s o r . H o w e v e r ,a si sw e l lk n o w n ,t h e s eﬁring costs
cannot be used by the professor to push up his or her wage. Note that a similar argument is
also acknowledged by Pries and Rogerson (2005), who write that "In reality, dismissal costs are
not incurred in the case of voluntary separations, ... In what follows, we shall abstract from this
aspect and assume that all separations in the model lead the entrepreneur to incur the cost d. In
this sense, we are really analyzing a separation tax levied on employers, rather than a dismissal
cost per se."
11In section 6 below, we consider the model with the more common two-tier structure that is
often used in search models with employment protection.
19Red workers to Green ones, conditional on a bad signal, and a discriminatory
equilibrium of this type cannot exist. Thus, we must check if this is the case.
Conditional on the signal γ, the expected proﬁts from hiring a Green worker
in a discriminatory equilibrium is (note that we have substituted out for the wage
equation (24), and that we now need a subscript indicating worker type as the
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where the assets values for unemployed workers are (see Appendix 7 for details)
UG =
z(r + s + γMφ)+φ(γM (βyH−βrV)(r+s+φ)
r+s +( 1− γM)wL)
(r + s + βγMφ)(r + s + φ)
(28)
UR =
z(r + s + γφη)+φη(γ
(βyH−βrV)(r+s+φη)
r+s +( 1− γ)wL)
(r + s + βγφη)(r + s + φη)
(29)
and the value of a vacancy is
V =
−c + q(αG(ηJG(γ,1) + (1 − η)JG(γ,1)) + αRηJR(γ,η))
r + q(αG + αRη)
= K (30)
with JG(γ,1) deﬁned by (26), JR(γ,η) by (27), UG by (28) and UR by (29). For a
discriminatory equilibrium to exist, we must have
JG(γ,1) >K>J R(γ,η)
i.e. conditional on a signal γ, the expected proﬁts from hiring a Green worker is
20greater than the value of a vacancy, while the expected proﬁts from hiring a Red
worker is lower.
5.1 Numerical simulations
As the model involves opposing and non-linear eﬀects, numerical illustrations are
useful to explore the eﬀects. Ideally, we would want to do a serious empirical
analyses where all parameter values are based on empirical evidence. However, for
many of the parameters, like the probability that an applicant with a good signal
turns out to be of high productivity, γ, no such evidence exists. Furthermore, the
model is in any case very stylized, including the assumption that all workers are
ex ante identical, irrespective of type. Thus, our aim is more modest. First, we
want to explore whether a discriminatory equilibrium is possible under plausible
parameter values, using empirical estimates whenever possible. Second, we will
analyse the eﬀect on the discriminatory equilibrium of changes in key parameter
values.
The simulations are based on the steady state equations, the matching function
(1), as well as the equations (26) and (27) (both calculated twice, for γ and γ),
(28), (29) and (30) (the latter also being two equations). We have chosen the
following parameter values, where the period length is assumed to be one quarter.
Output with high and low productivity are set to yH =1 .0 and yL =0 .55.T h e
cost of opening a vacancy K =1 1 , which corresponds to a capital-output ratio in
annual terms slightly below three. The interest rate r =0 .012, following Shimer
(2005), corresponding to an annual rate of about ﬁve. The workers’ bargaining
power β =0 .5. The wage in a low productivity match wL =0 .6, and the value
of being unemployed (leisure and unemployment beneﬁts) z =0 .5. In equilibrium,
this will induce an average replacement rate, calculated as z divided by the average
wage, of about 63%, which is about the level in many European countries. The
weight on vacancies in the matching function, 1 − λ =0 .4, see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001), who suggest that it should be between 0.3 and 0.5.F l o wi n t o
unemployment in European countries is between 0.3% and 2.8% on monthly basis
in European countries, see OECD (1995), page 27-28, and we choose s =0 .03 on
a quarterly basis. The probability that output takes a high value is γ =0 .7 and
21γ =0 .3, while Prob( γ = γ)=η =0 .6. The cost of a vacancy c =0 .02;t h i si s
lower than what is often used, e.g. Shimer (2005) has c =0 .2, but this must be seen
in connection with our also including ﬁxed costs of opening a vacancy. The share
of Green workers, nG =0 .9, implying that the share of Red workers, nR =0 .1.W e
set the parameter in the matching function, A =0 .3 which leads to equilibrium
labour tightness θ =0 .942,a n dt h em a t c h i n gr a t ef o rj o bs e a r c h e r sφ =0 .29.A s
this is on a quarterly basis, it is well within the range for the job ﬁnding rate for
unemployed in European countries, which according to OECD (1995), page 27-28
is between 3% and 21% on monthly basis in European countries. The parameter
values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
s 0.03 λ 0.6
r 0.012 c 0.02
yH 1.0 K 11
yL 0.55 η 0.6
β 0.5 γ 0.7
wL 0.6 γ 0.3
z 0.5 nG 0.9
A 0.3 nR 0.1
With these parameter values, we ﬁnd that a discriminatory equilibrium exists.
The values of the key variables are displayed in Table 2. We ﬁnd that JR(γ,η)=
10.913 <K=1 1< 11.026 = JG(γ,1). Thus, the advantage for the employer from
Green workers being more attractive on the job market, making them more likely
to quit if badly matched, dominates the eﬀect of Red workers being paid less. In
other words, it is proﬁtable to hire a Green with γ = γ, while it is not proﬁtable
hire a Red with γ = γ. The discriminatory behavior leads to a large diﬀerence in
unemployment rates, which is 9.3% for Green workers, and 14.6% for Red workers.
As Green workers are hired even with a bad signal, a slightly higher share of them
are in low productivity matches, the respective shares are 7.3% for Green workers
and 5.9% for Red workers. While workers in low productivity match receive a lower
wage, the average wage for Green workers is still somewhat higher than that of
22Red workers, 0.796 versus 0.787, because the lower unemployment rate for Green
workers improves their disagreement point in the wage bargaining, giving Green
workers higher wages than Red workers, conditional on a high productivity match.
Table 2: Simulation outcome
Variable Value Variable Value
θ 0.942 uG 0.093
φ 0.293 uR 0.146
JG(γ,1) 11.026 εG 0.073





wG and wR are the average wages for Green and Red workers,
uG and uR are the respective unemployment rates.
εG and εR are the share of employed workers in low productivity matches.
I nt h em o d e lw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eﬁring costs are prohibitive. However,
it is of interest to see how large the ﬁring costs would have to be for the ﬁrms to
be willing to retain workers even in a low productive match, as is assumed in the
model. If the ﬁrm can lay oﬀ a worker at a cost F>0,t h eﬁrm will retain a
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rV − yL + wL
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> 0, where pG =1 and pR = η
With parameter values as in Table 1, this criterion is fulﬁlled for FG =0 .543
and FR =0 .836, i.e. less than the production for one quarter with average pro-
ductivity, well within the parameter range of ﬁring costs explored by Mortenson
and Pissarides (1999), which is from zero to unity.
We then want to explore the eﬀects of labour market institutions. Which types
of labour market institutions are conducive to the existence of a discriminatory
equilibrium?
23Lower unemployment beneﬁts, z.
If z is reduced, workers receive lower wages ,a n di np a r t i c u l a rt h i sh a p p e n sf o r
Red workers, who have a larger probability of being unemployed. This makes Red
workers more attractive, implying that a discriminatory equilibrium becomes less
likely. For the parameter values displayed in Table 1, except for z, a discriminatory
equilibrium exists as long as z ≥ 0.43. For z<0.43, the wages of Red workers
have falled suﬃciently so that it is now proﬁtable to hire them even conditional
on a bad signal, implying that a discriminatory equilibrium of the mentioned type
does not exist.
Lower minimum wages wL.
A reduction in minimum wages wL reduces the loss for ﬁrms in the case of a
bad match. This makes Red workers more attractive, making a discriminatory
equilibrium less likely. For the parameter values in Table 1, except wL,ad i s -
criminatory equilibrium exists as long as wL ≥ 0.58.F o r wL < 0.58, it is again
proﬁtable to hire Red workers even conditional on a bad signal, and a discrimina-
tory equilibrium is not possible.
Higher cost of opening a vacancy, K
I nw h a tt y p e so fj o b ss h o u l dw ee x p e c tt oﬁnd discriminating behavior? In our
model, all jobs are identical. However, we could think of the economy consisting
of many segmented labour markets, where the equilibrium of the model describes
each segmented market, and diﬀerent parameter values capture the characteristics
of each labour market. Higher costs of a vacancy would correspond to jobs with
higher capital intensity. Higher costs of opening a vacancy increases the loss from a
bad match, which increases the possible costs of hiring a Red worker. The upshot
is to make a discriminatory equilibrium more likely. This can be illustrated by
increasing K from 11 to K =1 4 , and then redo the exercises above. We ﬁnd
that the critical value for the minimum wage is reduced, so that a discriminatory
equilibrium now exists for wL ≥ 0.53,d o w nf r o m0.58 for K =1 1 .T h u s ,i nj o b s
with high capital requirement, a discriminatory equilibrium is more likely, and it
can happen even for lower minimum wages.
24Numerical simulations with taste for discrimination We then consider
the situation where a share of all vacancies also are aﬀected by other motives than
proﬁt maximisation. Speciﬁcally, we assume that a proportion m of vacancies have
a taste for discrimination in the sense that they exogenously use a discriminatory
hiring rule. As above, we do not include any direct eﬀect on utility or wages of
this taste for discrimination, the only eﬀect is via the hiring rule.
Let superscript j denote type of ﬁrm, with j = N for a neutral ﬁrms (a ﬁrm
that applies γC
G = γ and γC
R = γ) and with j = D for a discriminatory ﬁrm (a
ﬁrm that applies γC
G = γ and γC
R = γ). The wage for a high productivity worker
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j. (31)
Since wages for high productivity workers now depend on the type of ﬁrm they
are employed in, we cannot apriori exclude on-the-job search for workers in high
productivity matches who are in a ﬁrm paying low wages. However, with the
parameter values we use, only workers in low productivity matches want to change
ﬁrms, consistent with the previous formulation. For a full description of the model
see Appendix 8.
Using the parameter values from the basis simulation above, we ﬁnd that the
critical value for m,d e ﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,i s˜ m =0 .35. Thus, in this case if
more than 35% of the vacancies have taste for discrimination, then it becomes
proﬁtable for all vacancies to discriminate. As emphasized above, this works in
the opposite direction of the eﬀect in Becker’s model. Here, discriminated workers
become less attractive for employers in spite of being paid less, implying that the
existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may indeed induce other
employers also to discriminate. Correspondingly, from Corollary 1, if more that
e a =1 − ˜ m =0 .65 of the ﬁrms for exogenous reasons apply a neutral hiring rule, any
remaining proﬁt maximising ﬁrm will also adopt a neutral hiring rule, implying
that the discriminatory equilibrium vanishes.
256R o b u s t n e s s
Here we discuss the robustness of the discriminatory equilibrium to diﬀerent mod-
elling assumptions.
6.1 Eﬃcient hiring
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the wage is given by ex post bargaining,
without any possibility of negotiations at the hiring stage. One implication of this
is that it rules out the possibility that a discriminated worker accepts an initial
p e r i o dw i t hal o ww a g e ,s oa st om a k ei tp r o ﬁt a b l ef o rt h ee m p l o y e rt oh i r eh i m / h e r .
In a discriminatory equilibrium, Red workers would be willing to do so, as they
are strictly disadvantaged by not having the opportunity to see whether output
turns out to be high even with a bad signal. Now, we shall relax this assumption.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that there is an additional hiring stage, where the
players bargain over the surplus of the match, after having observed the signal γ.
At this stage, output is y0 > 0, there is no on-the-job search and no employment
protection legislation. The wage is ﬂexible, and hiring will take place if the joint
surplus from the match is positive. If the worker is hired, the match transits to
the second stage at a rate κ>0. At this second stage, employment protection
with ﬁring costs is invoked, and the stochastic output is realised, being equal to
yH or yL.This two-stage framework follows e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
At the second stage the wage is renegotiated, reﬂecting the change in bargaining
situations. With low productivity, the minimum wage wL binds, while with high
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From (32), the wage at the second stage solves
W
H




i − V − Ui).
12In line with the arguments in footnote 9 above, we have not included ﬁring costs F in (32),
in contrast to most of the literature. However, as we assume ﬂexible wages in stage 1, including
ﬁring costs in (32) would not aﬀect the hiring decision made by the ﬁrm.
26As noted above, the ﬁring-cost is not present at the ﬁrst stage. Deﬁne J0 and
W0 as the values to the ﬁrm and the worker at the ﬁrst stage. The wage at the
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where Oi = Ui if the worker is unemployed and Oi = WL
i if the worker is employed.
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Note that the players at the ﬁrst stage will take into consideration their ex-
pected payoﬀs at the second stage. Thus, we allow for the possibility that a Red
worker accepts to work for a low or even negative wage in the ﬁrst period, to com-
pensate for the possibility of coming to the more rewarding second stage. While
one can discuss the realism of the wage being negative in an initial period, our aim
is to explore if a discriminatory equilibrium may exist even under circumstances
that come a long way towards ensuring eﬃciency.
Asset values at stage 1 are
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Hiring will be eﬃcient and take place iﬀ S0 is positive. Thus, for a discriminatory
equilibrium to exist we need that, conditional on a bad signal, the surplus of hiring
a Green worker is positive, while it is negative for a Red worker:
S
0
G(γ) > 0 >S
0
R(γ),w h e nγ
C
G = γ, and γ
C
R = γ. (33)
Given these hiring strategies the value of a vacancy is







and in equilibrium we still have V = K.
In appendix 9, we show that for certain parameter values, (33) holds, implying
that there exists a discriminatory equilibrium also allowing for eﬃcient hiring.13
The intuition can be explained as follows. A discriminatory equilibrium involves
an eﬃciency loss arising from not hiring Red workers conditional on a bad signal,
as this involves loosing the possibility of a high productivity match. However, the
costs to the ﬁrm of having a worker in a low productive match may be so high
that it outweighs this eﬃciency loss. In this case the joint surplus from hiring a
Red worker conditional on a bad signal is negative, implying that the worker is
not willing to reduce the ﬁr s tp e r i o dw a g es u ﬃciently that the ﬁrm proﬁts from
hiring him/her. Note however that the conditions under which a discriminatory
equilibrium exists are much more restrictive with eﬃcient hiring than under the
previous speciﬁcations, and the simulations we report in appendix 8 involve some
implausible parameter values.
6.2 Workers ﬁred
T os i m p l i f yt h ea n a l y s i s ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eﬁring costs are prohibitive so
that workers are never laid oﬀ. The numerical simulations above have shown that
the ﬁring costs need not be higher than what is often assumed in the literature.
However, qualitatively the same results may be derived also under the weaker
assumption that workers sometimes are laid oﬀ, but this is costly to the ﬁrm. The
key feature of the model that would be required is that in case the match is low
productive, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ with a Green worker that can be expected to ﬁnd
a new job, so no ﬁring costs are incurred, than a discriminated Red worker who
may have diﬃculty ﬁnding a job. Whether the ﬁring costs are so high that the ﬁrm
13To simplify we assume that wL = z which implies that that O = WL
i = Ui.A s s u m i n g
wL >zwould complicate the analysis considerably, as it would then be necessary to include four
types of applicants, depending both on type and on being unemployed or in bad match. The
simpliﬁcation wL = z is however likely to work against our ﬁnding a discriminatory equilibrium:
As illustrated in the numerical simulations in section 5, increasing the minimum wage makes a
discriminatory equilibrium more likely.
28prefers not to lay oﬀ a Red workers (as illustrated in the numerical simulations
above), or whether the ﬁrm proﬁts from laying oﬀ the worker and incurring the
costs, is not important, as long as both alternatives are considerably more costly
than letting a Green worker leaving voluntarily when being oﬀered another job.
Similarly, it would be straight forward to extend our model to incorporate a
third level of productivity; yMin with yMin <y L at which ﬁr m sa l w a y sw o u l dﬁre,
while ﬁrms wait for voluntary transition at the intermediate level yL.
6.3 Workers’ search intensity
We have assumed that the search intensity is exogenous and identical for of- and
on-the-job search. Having diﬀerent exogenous search intensities would not aﬀect
our result as long as workers in matches with y = yL prefer employment to un-
employment. Rather, in a setting with endogenous search intensity discriminatory
outcomes seem more likely. Green workers would presumably choose a higher
search intensity than Red workers, as their return to search is higher. As a conse-
quence, Green workers would leave low productivity matches even faster.
7 Empirical evidence and implications:
In this section we discuss how our model fares when contrasted with the actual
labor market situation of two groups for whom there is evidence of discrimination
in the labor market, namely immigrants and older workers. We start the discussion
with a huge caveat: the main aim of our model is to show a theoretical point, that
discrimination can prevail even for identical workers. In practice, groups that
are discriminated against are seldom identical on other accounts. Immigrants,
for example, have generally lower language and cultural skills than the native
population, and often also weaker formal qualiﬁcations. Such diﬀerences are likely
to be reﬂected in the labor market outcomes. Thus we focus on the key empirical
implications, rather than trying to to match empirical data.
Generally, unemployment is considerably higher among immigrants than among
natives. Comparing unweighted averages across OECD countries, the unemploy-
ment rate is almost 40 percent higher for foreign-born than for native-born (OECD
292008, Table 5.6). Some evidence suggests that when comparable measures of skill
exists, immigrants with levels comparable to the native-born seem to ﬁnd work
commensurate with their formal qualiﬁcations (OECD, 2007b, page 50). However,
other types of evidence suggest that discriminatory practices exist. One piece of
evidence is based on experimental tests of hiring procedures, where applications
for the same job are submitted from two ﬁctitious candidates with essentially the
same qualiﬁcations, but where diﬀerent name indicates diﬀerent nationality. In
all countries where this test has been undertaken, the results show that employers
favor the native applicants at all stages of the hiring process. On average, the net
additional elimination of immigrant applicants is about one third, varying some-
what across countries (OECD, 2007b, page 53).14 Further suggestive evidence of
discrimination is the fact that also second-generation immigrants generally have
weaker labour market outcomes than native-borns (OECD, 2007b, page 59). While
some of the diﬀerence reﬂects lower educational levels, part of the gap remains even
if one controls for lower education (OECD 2007b, page 64). Even after long stays
in the host country, immigrants are also much more likely than native-borns to be
overqualiﬁed, i.e. to have a job that require lower education than the person has
(OECD, 2006, page 145).
Our hypothesis suggests that part of the discrimination of immigrants is linked
to the existence of EPL. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of Kahn
(2007), who explores the eﬀect of EPL on joblessness and temporary employment
by demographic groups on micro data from the International Adult Literacy Survey
for Canada, the US and ﬁve European countries. Kahn ﬁnds that strict EPL has
as i g n i ﬁcant negative eﬀect on employment levels for immigrants, as predicted by
the current model, and it also raises the incidence of temporary employment for
immigrant women.
Sá (2008) on the other hand, using the EU Labour Force Study, ﬁnds that
strict EPL favours immigrants, as strict EPL reduces employment for natives with
less or no eﬀect on immigrant employment. However, Sá interprets this ﬁnding as
arising from immigrants generally being less informed about their rights, and thus
in practice being less protected by EPL. One support for this interpretation is that
14Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) obtain about the same extent of discrimination for
African-Americans in the US, using essentially the same method.
30unionization rates are generally much lower for immigrants than for natives (Sá,
2008), and union membership is often a key way of getting information and help
in exercising the rights.
One should however be fairly cautious when interpreting evidence on the link
between immigrant unemployment and EPL. Immigrant unemployment across
c o u n t r i e si sa l s os t r o n g l yi n ﬂuenced by vast diﬀerences in immigrant population.
OECD countries with large job immigration, like Spain or the US, or rather se-
lective immigration, like Australia and Canada, have fairly low immigrant unem-
ployment, as compared to total unemployment rates. In contrast, unemployment
among immigrants is much higher as compared to native unemployment in coun-
tries like Denmark, Norway and Sweden, where many immigrants are refugees or
family reuniﬁcation. Furthermore, employment protection legislation is a complex
i s s u ea n dt h ee ﬀective job protection varies strongly across various parts of the la-
bor market. Thus, in a country with strict employment protection in parts of the
labor market, immigrants may ﬁnd employment in other parts where legislation
is less strict. Finally, even if immigrants are discriminated against when comes
to permanent jobs, they may accept temporary jobs or become self-employed (see
below), preventing any eﬀect on unemployment rates.15
A way to avoid these problems is to look at the eﬀect of diﬀerences in employ-
ment protection within countries instead of across countries. Using data from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) , Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009)
ﬁnd that workers feel most secure in permanent public sector jobs, and least se-
cure in temporary jobs.16 Incidentally, in almost all OECD countries (Belgium
being the only exception) immigrants are under represented in public sector jobs,
as compared to native-borns (OECD, 2007c, page 73). Indeed, even children of
15The diﬀerences in wage dispersion across countries is also a factor that makes it more diﬃcult
to ﬁnd a link between cross-country diﬀerence in EPL and diﬀerences in unemployment. Causa
and Jean (2007) ﬁnd empirical support for stronger "EPL dualism" (deﬁned as the relative
level of EPL for permanent vs. temporary contracts) widens the wage gap but reduces the
employment/activity gap between immigrants and natives. This is explained as being caused
by immigrants more frequently holding temporary jobs, so that EPL in temporary jobs is more
relevant for them.
16Surprisingly, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) ﬁnd that perceived job security is lower in coun-
tries with strict EPL, suggesting that there imp o r t a n ta s p e c t sn o tc a p t u r e db yt h eO E C Di n d e x .
The exception to this negative relationship is for employees in permanent public jobs, who feel
secure everywhere.
31immigrants tend to be under represented in the public sector (OECD, 2007c, page
85). The underrepresentation of immigrants in the public sector is consistent with
public sector employers being reluctant to hiring immigrants, being aware of the
additional diﬃculty in the public sector of getting rid of employees who do not ﬁt
to the job requirements. However, there are also other possible explanations for
underrepresentation of immigrants in the public sector, for instance that require-
m e n t sa st ol a n g u a g eo rs o c i e t a lk n o w l e d g em a yb eh i g h e ri np a r t so ft h ep u b l i c
sector.
Also other labour market features are consistent with the notion that some im-
migrants face discrimination when trying to obtain a permanent job in the regular
labor market. First, in almost all OECD countries, immigrants are much more
likely to have temporary jobs than are native-born (OECD, 2007c, page 75). This
would follow if employment protection applies only on permanent jobs, and that
they are less relevant for temporary jobs. Second, evidence from Sweden shows
that immigrants are more likely than native-borns to exit from temporary help
agencies into other sectors of activity (Anderson and Wadensjö, 2004a). This may
suggest that temporary work assignments may work as a screening device which
may overcome possible reluctance among employers in hiring immigrants. This
interpretation is consistent with evidence from Denmark, showing that wage sub-
sidies and subsidised employer-based training are more eﬀective at getting immi-
grants into employment than native born persons (OECD, 2007b, page 51). These
programs enable employers to experience how well immigrants perform on the job,
implying that hiring decisions are made on more certain information, reducing the
risk of a low productive and unproﬁtable match. Anderson and Wadensjö (2004b)
show that immigrants in the labor market in many cases also use self employment
as a way of escaping marginalization in the labor market.
Another salient aspect of immigrant unemployment is that the unemployment
gap between immigrants and natives widen as the education level rises in all OECD
countries (OECD, 2008, page 114). This is as predicted by the model in the current
paper, conditional on the reasonable assumption that the loss associated with a low
productive match are higher for higher levels of education. One reason to assume
that costs of a low productive match are higher for higher levels of education is the
empirical ﬁnding that capital is complementary with the use of skilled labor, see
32e.g. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005). Capital being complementary with
high skilled labor suggests that jobs with employees with high education should be
associated with higher costs of opening a vacancy, K,w h i c hi no u rm o d e lm a k e s
a discriminatory equilibrium more likely.
Ad i ﬀerent prediction of our model is that employers are less reluctant to
discriminate a group of workers if a weaker labor market situation has a strong
downward eﬀect on wages. This prediction would suggest that foreign unemploy-
ment will be high relative to native unemployment in countries with small wage
compression. This is consistent with evidence across 16 OECD countries, where
we ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between the ratio of foreign to native un-
employment and wage dispersion, as measured by the ratio of the ﬁfth to the ﬁrst
percentile (this measure of wage dispersion captures dispersion in the lower part of
the wage distribution, which is the wage dispersion of relevance in the theoretical
model).17
Another group that is subject to discrimination in the labor market is older
workers (OECD, 2006). Clearly, as group, older workers diﬀer from younger ones in
several ways, including job experience, expected future working years, and formal
qualiﬁcations. However, in contrast to for immigrants, there are no issues of race
or cultural or languages skills. Yet in all OECD countries, hiring rates of workers
decline signiﬁcantly after the age of 50, although more sharply in some countries
than others (OECD, 2006, page 132). While we clearly cannot say why this is
so, the fact that hiring rates fall will within our model have negative feedback
eﬀects on the employability of older workers, as ﬁrms expect older workers to
have a harder time ﬁnding another job in case the current one does not work out.
Furthermore, our model is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Behaghel, Crépon
and Sédillot (2008) mentioned in the Introduction. They ﬁnd that a tax on ﬁrms’
laying oﬀ workers aged 50 and above had a negative eﬀect on ﬁrms’ hiring of
workers in the relevant age groups, consistent with the mechanism proposed in
this paper. Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2006) found that the introduction of
wrongful-discharge laws have reduced state employment rates, and the long-term
eﬀects are greater for older workers than for younger.
17The evidence is available on request.
338 Conclusions
We oﬀer a novel argument for discriminatory outcomes of equally productive
groups, in labor markets where it is costly for ﬁrms to layoﬀ workers. The key
mechanism is that workers’ with low job-ﬁnding rates are risky to hire since they
might stay for long also in case of a bad match. Discrimination is self-enforcing, as
it is precisely because a group is discriminated against that it has lower job-ﬁnding
rates, and thus become less attractive to hire.
In our model, groups are identical except for the color and discrimination may
in principle hit any group. Furthermore, there also exists an equilibrium without
any discrimination. However, we show that if a suﬃciently large proportion of the
employers have a taste for discrimination, then the unique equilibrium outcome
is a situation with discrimination of this group. Thus, also employers without a
taste for discrimination will apply discriminatory hiring strategies, because hiring
the discriminated group is less proﬁtable. We also show that aﬃrmative action is
potentially an eﬃcient measure against discrimination. If a suﬃciently large share
of the employers hire according to the population shares of each group, the dis-
criminatory equilibrium vanishes. This eﬀect of aﬃrmative action is diﬀerent from
the eﬀect of aﬃrmative action if discrimination is the result of underinvestment in
human capital by the discriminated group.
In the core model outside options only serve as constraints. When outside op-
tions are the threat points in the bargaining, workers from the discriminated group
receive lower wages, for a given productivity,making discriminatory outcomes less
likely. However, a discriminatory equilibrium still exists. Numerical simulations
suggests that a discriminatory outcome is more likely the higher the unemployment
beneﬁts and the higher the minimum wages.
While the main aim of the paper is to make a theoretical point, several of the
empirical predictions of the model are consistent with salient features of the labor
market situation of immigrants to OECD countries. In almost all OECD countries,
immigrants are much more likely to hold temporary jobs than are native-borns,
consistent with employers being more reluctant to hire immigrants in permanent
jobs with employment protection. In the OECD Economic Survey of Sweden 2007,
one of the key elements to combat exclusion is "to reduce the risk associated with
34h i r i n gs o m e o n ew h ot u r n so u tn o tt ob et h er i g h tp e r s o nf o rt h ej o b " . I ns p i t e
of extensive measures to help immigrants entering the labor market, high unem-
ployment rates and overqualiﬁcation remain an important problem for immigrants
in the Nordic countries. This is consistent with the model, in view of the high
welfare level and small wage dispersion of the Nordic countries, as compared to
most other OECD countries. The model is also consistent with the strong ten-
dency across OECD countries that the unemployment gap between immigrants
and natives widen as the education level increases.
9 Appendix
Appendix 1: Steady state conditions
Let εi denote the share of employed workers of type i in jobs with low match
quality. For both types i,t h eo u t ﬂow from jobs with bad matches must equal the
inﬂow to jobs with bad matches
niεi(s + φpi)(1 − ui)=vqμ(γ
c
i)(1 − E(γ |γ ≥ γ
c
i))αi.
Similarly, the outﬂow from good matches equals inﬂow to good matches
ni(1 − εi)s(1 − ui)=vqμ(γ
c
i)E(γ |γ ≥ γ
c
i) αi.
Using the above two equations gives us
E(γ |γ ≥ γ
c





s(1 − E(γ |γ ≥ γc
i))
s + E(γ |γ ≥ γc
i) φpi
. (34)
As the outﬂow from unemployment equals inﬂow to unemployment, we must
have
niui(s + φpi)=sni.





The job seekers consist of the unemployed as well as the employed in bad
matches. The fraction of all job seekers that are of type i, αi,i sd e ﬁned by
αi =
ni(ui +( 1− ui)εi)
nG(uG +( 1− uG)εG)+nR(uR +( 1− uR)εR)
. (36)
Appendix 2: Assumption 1 holds if equation (19) holds







Using (9) and that φ =0and αi = ni when θ =0gives
V (0) = nG
γM((1 − β)yH + sV )+( 1− γM)
¡
(1 − β)yL + sV
¢
(r + s)(nG + nRη)
+nRη
γ((1 − β)yH + sV )+( 1− γ)
¡
(1 − β)yL + sV
¢


















L) >r K .
A p p e n d i x3 :P r o o fo fL e m m a1
V is continuous in θ, V (0) >K ,a n dlim
θ→∞




1 such that dV












V (θ) < 0 for θ>θ
1. Deﬁne θ
0 to be the smallest non-negative value of b θ
0
.
A p p e n d i x4 :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
F i r s tw ed os o m ed e ﬁnitions. Using (9) we can deﬁne J(γ,p) as a function of

















Denote ˆ J(θ,γ,1) by ˆ JG(θ,γ) and denote ˆ J(θ,γ,η) by ˆ JR(θ,γ).
Using (9) we can deﬁne E(JG
¯ ¯γ ≥ γ) as a function of γ and θ; e JG(θ,γ) where,
e JG(θ,γ)=
ηγ +( 1− η)γ
r + s
((1 − β)y
H + sV (θ))
+
1 − (ηγ +( 1− η)γ)
r + s + φ(θ)
¡
(1 − β)y
L +( s + φ(θ))V (θ)
¢
(38)
Noting that E(JR |γ ≥ γ) is independent of γ, we can similarly deﬁne E(JR |γ ≥ γ)







r + s + φ(θ)η
¡
(1 − β)y
L +( s + φ(θ)η)V (θ)
¢
Using (11) we can deﬁne V as a function of θ, e JG(θ,γ) and e JR(θ); e V (θ, e JG(θ,γ), e JR(θ))
where
e V (θ, e JG(θ,γ), e JR(θ)) =
−c + q(θ)
³
αG e JG(θ,γ)+αRη e JR(θ)
´
r + q(θ)(αG + αRη)
(39)
and ﬁnally we deﬁne
ˆ V (θ,γ)=e V (θ, e JG(θ,γ), e JR(θ)).
A sp a r to ft h ee x i s t e n c ep r o o fw ew a n tt os h o wt h a tt h e r ee x i s tv a l u e sθ and θ,
such that when θ ≤ θ<θ it is proﬁtable to hire Green workers, i.e. J(γ,1)−V ≥ 0
and at the same time not proﬁt a b l et oh i r eR e d ,i . e .J(γ,η) − V< 0. As a ﬁrst
37step we show that the proﬁtability of a hiring a worker is increasing in θ,a n dγ
on the interval where V is decreasing in θ.













Pr o o f .Deﬁne fi(θ,γ)= ˆ Ji(θ,γ) − ˆ V (θ,γ).





















pi(1 − γ)(rV − (yL − wL))
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∂V < 1 and ∂V






























∂γ > 0.F r o m( 3 9 )i tf o l l o w st h a t0 < ∂h V
∂ h JG <
1. Hence,
∂fG(θ,γ)






∂γ we also have that
∂fR(θ,γ)
∂γ > 0.
Lemma 4 a)There exist a unique γ0,f o rw h i c h ˆ JG(θ
1,γ0) − ˆ V (θ
1,γ0)=0and a
unique γ1 for which ˆ JG(θ
0,γ1)− ˆ V (θ
0,γ1)=0where 0 <γ 0 <γ 1 < 1.
38Pr o o f .Recall that fG(θ,γ)= ˆ JG(θ,γ)− ˆ V (θ,γ). Since we are considering the
case when ﬁrms want workers with y = yL to leave we know that fG < 0 for γ =0 .
Furthermore, as ˆ JG(θ,γ) is the highest possible expected value at the hiring stage
we have that ˆ JG(θ,γ) > ˆ V (θ) for any θ.





and fG(θ,γ) is decreasing
and continuous in both its arguments there exists a value γ0,f o rw h i c hfG(θ
1,γ0)=
0 and a value γ1 for which fG(θ
0,γ1)=0 .S i n c eθ
1 >θ
0 , ˆ JG − ˆ V is increasing in
both θ and γ,w eh a v et h a tγ0 <γ 1.





deﬁned by ˆ JG(θ,γ) − ˆ V (θ,γ)=0such that for θ<θit is unproﬁtable to
hire a Green worker, while for θ ≥ θ it is proﬁtable.
Lemma 5 For γ ∈
¡
γ0,γ1¢





such that ˆ JG(θ,γ) −
ˆ V (θ,γ) T 0 for θ T θ.
Pr o o f .Consider any γ0 ∈
¡
γ0,γ1¢
. Since ˆ JG − ˆ V is continuous and strictly
increasing in θ it is suﬃcient to show that ˆ JG(θ
0,γ0)−ˆ V (θ
0,γ0) > 0 and ˆ JG(θ
1,γ0)−
ˆ V (θ
1,γ0) < 0. This, however, follows directly from the deﬁnitions of γ0,a n dγ1






Deﬁnition: Deﬁne θ by ˆ JG(θ,γ) − ˆ V (θ,γ)=0and deﬁne θ by θ =arg min n
ˆ JR(θ,γ) − ˆ V (θ,γ)=0 ,V(θ)=K
o
.F u r t h e r m o r e , d e ﬁne K and K by K = V (θ)
and K = V (θ).
Thus, θ is the lowest value of θ for which it is proﬁtable to hire a Green worker
with γ = γ and θ t h el o w e s tv a l u eo fθ for which it is proﬁt a b l et oh i r eaR e d
worker with γ = γ if this value of θ implies that V> K ,o t h e r w i s eθ is deﬁned by
V (θ)=K. Note the θ
0 ≤ θ <θ<θ
1,w h e r et h eﬁrst inequality holds from Lemma
5 and the last inequality holds from the deﬁnition of θ.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1: Since ˆ Ji(θ,γ) − ˆ V (θ,γ) is strictly









.( A s θ >θ
0 and θ ≤ θ
1). From the deﬁnition of K and K we have that




and hence that ˆ JG(θ,γ) − ˆ V (θ,γ) ≥ 0 and ˆ JR(θ,γ) −
ˆ V (θ,γ) < 0 for K ∈ (K,K]. Thus, conditions (20) and (21) are satisﬁed and the
proposition follows.
39Appendix 5 Proof of Lemma 2
Pr o o f .Let superscript NEdenote the neutral equilibrium where γC
G = γC
R = γ
and superscript DE denote the discriminatory equilibrium where γC





R = γ. Then JNE
R (γ,1) = JNE
G (γ,1). For γC
G = γC
R = γ to
be an equilibrium we need to show that JNE
G (γ,1) >K.I ti ss u ﬃcient to show
that JNE
G (γ,1) >J DE
G (γ,1) since JDE
G (γ,1) >Kby assumption (discriminatory
equilibria exists)





H + sV )+
(1 − γ)




L +( s + φ)V
¢
It is proﬁtable to hire a Green worker with γ = γ if JG(γ,1) >V .In equilibrium
V = K. JG(γ,1) is increasing in φ.T h u si fφ
NE >φ
DE we know that JNE
G (γ,1) >
JDE
G (γ,1).S i n c eV is increasing in pR it follows that when pG = pR =1we have
that V> Kat φ
DE.T h u sφ
NE >φ
DE.
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 2.
From (20) we know that JR(γ,p R) (given by (22)) >Kfor m =1 ,a n df r o m
(21) that JR(γ,p R) <Kfor m =0 .A s JR(γ,p R) is continuous in m,i tt h e n
suﬃces to show that JR(γ,p R) is decreasingly monotonically in m,a st h e r et h e n











We see from (22) that
∂JR(γ,pR)




∂m,f o rag i v e n
φ, which also implies a given θ,ah i g h e rm leads to a lower JR(γ,p G), implying a
lower V .Al o w e rV will reduce entry of ﬁrms, thus reducing labor market tightness
θ, implying that φ will also be lower. Hence,
∂φ
∂m < 0 and thus
dJR(γ,pR)
dm < 0.
Appendix 7: Equations (28) and (29)
40The asset value of a Green, unemployed worker is (from (2))
(r + s + φ)UG = z + φEWG(γ) (40)





r+s +( 1− γM)wL
r + s + γMφ
.
Inserting for wH
G given by (24) yeilds
EWG(γ)=
γM (βyH+(1−β)(r+s)UG−βrV)(r+s+φ)
r+s +( 1− γM)wL
r + s + γMφ
(41)
Using (40) and (41) gives
(r + s + φ)UG = z + φ
γM (βyH+(1−β)(r+s)UG−βrV)(r+s+φ)
r+s +( 1− γM)wL
r + s + γMφ
or
(r + s + γ
Mφ)(r + s + φ)UG
= z(r + s + γ
Mφ)+φ(γ






(r + s + γ
Mφ)(r + s + φ)UG − φ(1 − β)γ
M(r + s + φ)UG
= z(r + s + γ
Mφ)+φ(γ







z(r + s + γMφ)+φ(γM (βyH−βrV)(r+s+φ)
r+s +( 1− γM)wL)
(r + s + βγMφ)(r + s + φ)
Likewise for unemployed Red workers
UR =
z(r + s + γφη)+φη(γ
(βyH−βrV)(r+s+φη)
r+s +( 1− γ)wL)
(r + s + βγφη)(r + s + φη)
41Appendix 8: Numerical simulations with a taste for discrimination
















L +( s + φpi)V
j¢
j = N,D. (42)
Let W
j
i (γ) denote the expected value of employment for a color i worker in a type


















G(γ,1) + (1 − η)JD
G(γ,1)) + αRηJD
R(γ,η))
r + q(αG + αRη)
(44)




G (γ,1) + (1 − η)JN
G (γ,1)) + αR(ηJN
R (γ,η)+( 1− η)JN
R (γ,1)))
r + q(αG + αRη)
(45)
The hiring probabilities are given by
pG =1 (46)
pR =( 1− m)+mη (47)
As before let εi denote the share of employed workers of type i in jobs with
low match quality. For both types i,t h eo u t ﬂow from jobs with bad matches must
equal the inﬂow to jobs with bad matches. For Red workers we have
nRεR(s + pRφ)(1 − uR)=vq((1 − m)(1 − γ
M)+mη(1 − γ))αR.
42Similarly, the outﬂow from good matches equals inﬂow to good matches
nR(1 − εR)s(1 − uR)=vq((1 − m)γ
M + mηγ)αG.














The expressions for Ui is given by (2), ui given by (16) αi given by (17) and θ by
V N = K.
Appendix 9: Numerical simulations with eﬃcient hiring
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
s 0.03 λ 0.6
r 0.012 c 0.02
yH 1.0 K 0.444
yL 0 η 0.65
y0 0.732 A 0.3
κ 1 γ 0.7
β 0.5 γ 0.3
wL 0.9 nG 0.9
z 0.9 nR 0.1
With these parameter values, we ﬁnd that a discriminatory equilibrium exists.
The values of the key variables are displayed in Table 2. We ﬁnd that S0
G(γ) >
0 >S 0
R(γ), implying that, conditional on a bad signal, it is proﬁtable to hire
Green workers but not proﬁtable to hire Red workers. Thus, again the advantage
for the employer from Green workers being more attractive on the job market,
43making them more likely to quit if badly matched, dominates the eﬀect of Red
workers being paid less. The discriminatory behavior leads to a large diﬀerence
in unemployment rates, which is 24.6% for Green workers, and 33.4% for Red
workers. As Green workers are hired even with a bad signal, a slightly higher
share of them are in low productivity matches, the respective shares are 16.2% for
Green workers and 12.5% for Red workers.Note that both types of workers must
accept a large, negative wage in the ﬁrst period, -3.67, to make it proﬁtable for
the ﬁrm to hire them.
Table 2: Simulation outcome
Variable Value Variable Value
θ 0.0523 uG 0.246
φ 0.092 uR 0.334
S0
G(γ) 0.0004 εG 0.162
S0





Acemoglu, Daron and Angrist, Joshua D. (2001), “Consequences of Employment
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act”, Journal of
Political Economy, 109, 915-957.
Addison, John T. and Teixeira, Paulino (2003), “The Economics of Employment
protection”, Journal of Labor Research, 24, 85-129.
Anderson, Pernilla and Wadensjö, Eskil (2004a), “Temporary Employment Agen-
cies: A Route for Immigrants to Enter the Labour Market?”, IZA Discussion
Paper no 1090, Bonn.
Anderson, Pernilla and Wadensjö, Eskil (2004b), “Self-employed Immigrants in
Denmark and Sweden: A Way to Economic Self-Reliance”, IZA Discussion
Paper no 1130, Bonn.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1973), “The Theory of Discrimination” In Discrimination in
Labor Markets, edited by Orley Ashenfelter, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 3-33.
Athey, Susan C., Avery, Christopher and Zemsky, Peter (2000), “Mentoring and
Diversity”, American Economic Review, Vol 90, no 4, 765-786.
Author, David, Donohue John. and Schwab, Stewart (2006), “The Costs of
Wrongful-Discharge Laws”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2),
May, 211 - 231.
Burdett, Kenneth and Mortensen, Dale T. (1998), “Wage diﬀerentials, Employer
Size and Unemployment”, International Economic Review, May, 39, 257-273.
Behaghel, Luc, Crépon, Bruno and Sédillot, Béatrice (2008), “The perverse eﬀects
of partial employment protection reform: The case of French older workers”,
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), 696-721.
Becker, Gary S. (1957), “The Economics of Discrimination”, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
45Bentolila, Samuel and Bertola, Giuseppe (1990), “Firing Costs and Labour De-
mand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 381-402.
Bertrand, Marianne, and Mullainathan, Sendhil (2004). “Are Emily and Greg
more Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination”, American Economic Review, Vol 94, 4, 991-1013.
Binmore, Ken G., Rubinstein, Ariel and Wolinsky, Asher, (1986), “The Nash
Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling”, Rand Journal of Economics,
17(2), Summer, 176-188.
Binmore, Ken G. Shaked, Avner and Sutton, John (1989), “An outside option
experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 4, 753-770.
Black, Dan A. (1995), “Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model”, Journal
of Labor Economics,1 3 ( 2 ) ,3 0 9 -3 3 4 .
Bowlus, Audra and Eckstein, Zvi (2002), “Discrimination and Skill Diﬀerences
in an Equilibrium Search Model”, International Economic Review, 43, 4,
1309-1345.
Causa. Orsetta and Jean, Sebastien (2007), “Integration of Immigrants in OECD
Countries: Do Policies Matter?”, OECD Economics Department Working
Paper 564.
Charles, Kerwin K. and Guryan, Jonathan (2008), “Prejudice and Wages: An
Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination”, Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 116(5), 773-809.
Clark, Andrew and Postel-Vinay, Fabien (2009), “Job Security and Job Protec-
tion”, Oxford Economic Papers, 61, 207-239.
Coate, Stephen and Loury Glenn C. (1993), “Will Aﬃrmative-Action Policies
Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?”, American Economic Review, 83, 1220-
1240.
Cornell, Bradford and Welch, Ivo (1996), “Culture, Information, and Screening
Discrimination”, Journal of Political Economy, vol 104, no 3.
46Darity, William A. and Mason, Patrick L. (1998), “Evidence on Discrimination
in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12(2), 63-90.
DeLeire, Thomas (2000), “The Wage and Employment Eﬀects of the Americans
with Disability Act”, Journal of Human Resources, 35, 693-715.
Diamond, Peter A. (1982), “Wage Determination and Eﬃciency in Search Equi-
librium”, Review of Economic Studies, 49, 217-227.
Garibaldi, Pietro and Violante, Giovanni L. (2005), “The employment Eﬀects of
Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities”, Economic Journal, 115, 799-832.
Hall, Robert E. and Milgrom, Paul R. (2008), “The Limited Inﬂuence of Unem-
ployment on the Wage Bargain”, American Economic Review, 98(4) 1653-74.
Holzer, Harry (2007), “The impact of aﬃr m a t i v ea c t i o ni nt h eU S ” ,Swedish
Economic Policy Review, 14, 41-71.
Hopenhayn, Hugo and Rogerson, Richard (1993), “Job Turnover and Policy Eval-
uation: A General Equilibrium Analysis”, Journal of Political Economy,1 0 1 ,
915-938.
Hornstein, Andreas, Krusell, Per and Violante, Giovanni L. (2005), “The eﬀect
of technical change on labor market inequalities”, Handbook of Economic
G r o w t h ,V o l u m e1 ,P a r t2 ,C h a p t e r2 0 , 1275-1370.
Kahn, Lawrence M. (2007), “The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates
on Demographic Temporary Employment Patterns: International Microeco-
nomic Evidence”, Economic Journal, 117: F333-F356.
Lang, Kevin, Manove, Michael and Dickens, William (2005), “Racial Discrimi-
nation in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Oﬀers”, American Economic
Review, 95(4), 1327-1340.
Lundberg, Shelly J. and Startz, Richard (1983), “Private Discrimination and
Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets ”, American Economic
Review, Vol 73(3), 340-347.
47Mailath, George, Samuelson, Larry and Shaked, Avner (2000), “Endogenous in-
equality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search”, American Eco-
nomic Review, 90, No 1, 46-72.
Masters, Adrian (2009), “Matching with Interviews”, Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control, vol. 33(4), 938-954.
Mortensen, Dale T. (1982), “The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bar-
gaining Game”, in The Economics of Information and Uncertainty.J o h jJ .
McCall, ed Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 233-254.
Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A. (1994), “Job Creation and Job
Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment”, Review of Economic Studies,
61, 397-415.
Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher A. (1999), “New Developments
in Models of Search in the Labor Market.” In Handbook of Labor Economics,
edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Volume 3B, 2567-2627.
Nagypál, Éva (2007), “Learning by Doing vs. Learning about Match Quality:
Can We Tell Them Apart?”, Review of Economic Studies, 74(2), 537-566.
OECD (1995), Employment Outlook
OECD (2004), Employment Outlook.
OECD (2006), Employment Outlook
OECD (2007a), Economic Survey of Sweden 2007
OECD (2007b), Jobs for Immigrants.
OECD (2007c), International Migration Outlook
OECD (2008), A proﬁle of immigrant populations.
Petrongolo, Barbara and Pissarides, Christopher A. (2001), “Looking into the
Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function”, Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 39(2), 390-431.
48Pissarides, Christopher A. (1985), “Short-Run Dynamics of Unemployment, Va-
cancies, and Real Wages”, American Economic Review, 75(4), 676-90.
Pissarides, Christopher A. (2000), “Equilibrium Unemployment Theory ”, MIT
press, Cambridge MA.
Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Turon, Helene (2009), “On-the-job Search, Productivity
Shocks, and the Individual Earnings Process”, Forthcoming, International
Economic Review.
Pries, Michael and Rogerson, Richard (2005), “Hiring Policies, labor market in-
stitutions, and Labor Market Flows”, Journal of Political Economy,1 1 3 ( 4 ) ,
811-839.
Rosén, Åsa (1997), “An Equilibrium Search-Matching Model of Discrimination”,
European Economic Review, 41, 1589-1613.
Rosén, Åsa (2003), “Search, Bargaining and Employer Discrimination”, Journal
of Labor Economics, 21, 807-829.
Sà, Filipa G. (2008), “Does Employment Protection Help Immigrants? Evidence
from European Labor Markets”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3414.
Saint-Paul, Gilles (1995), “The High Unemployment Trap”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 110(2), 527-550.
Saint-Paul, Gilles (1997), “Dual Labor Markets: A Macroeconomic Perspective”,
MIT Press.
Shimer, Robert (2005), “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment
and Vacancies”, American Economic Review, 95, 25-49.
49CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
 
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 
 
2770 Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue, Eliciting Individual Preferences for Pension 
Reform, August 2009 
 
2771 Christian Breuer and Chang Woon Nam, VAT on Intra-Community Trade and Bilateral 
Micro Revenue Clearing in the EU, August 2009 
 
2772 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad, Jakob De Haan and Bert Scholtens, Growth and Earnings 
Persistence in Banking Firms: A Dynamic Panel Investigation, August 2009 
 
2773 Erdal Yalcin, Uncertain Productivity Growth and the Choice between FDI and Export, 
August 2009 
 
2774 Klaus Abberger, Wolfgang Nierhaus and Shynar Shaikh, Findings of the Signal 
Approach for Financial Monitoring in Kazakhstan, September 2009 
 
2775 Sascha O. Becker, Francesco Cinnirella and Ludger Woessmann, The Trade-off 
between Fertility and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition, 
September 2009 
  
2776 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy, September 2009 
 
2777 Joel Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax 
Economics, September 2009 
 
2778 Cagri Seda Kumru and Athanasios C. Thanopoulos, Social Security Reform and 
Temptation, September 2009 
 
2779 Alessandro Bucciol and Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, Inter- and Intra-generational 
Consequences of Pension Buffer Policy under Demographic, Financial and Economic 
Shocks, September 2009 
 
2780 Eduardo Strube and Marcelo Resende, Complementarity of Innovation Policies in the 
Brazilian Industry: An Econometric Study, September 2009 
 
2781 Henry Tulkens and Vincent van Steenberghe, “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In 
Search of the Right Mix in the Face of Climate Change, September 2009 
 
2782 Maria L. Loureiro, Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano and Daniela Vuri, Smoking Habits: Like 
Father, Like Son, Like Mother, Like Daughter, September 2009 
 
2783 Momi Dahan, Tehila Kogut and Moshe Shalem, Do Economic Policymakers Practice 
what they Preach? The Case of Pension Decisions, September 2009 
 
2784 Eytan Sheshinski, Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education, September 2009 
 
2785 Nannette Lindenberg and Frank Westermann, How Strong is the Case for Dollarization 
in Costa Rica? A Note on the Business Cycle Comovements with the United States, 
September 2009 
 
2786 Leif Danziger, Noncompliance and the Effects of the Minimum Wage on Hours and 
Welfare in Competitive Labor Markets, September 2009 
 
2787 Gerlinde Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber and Christian Traxler, Testing Enforcement 
Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information, September 
2009 
 
2788 Gabriel J. Felbermayr, Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Unemployment in an 
Interdependent World, September 2009 
 
2789 Sebastian G. Kessing, Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices, 
September 2009 
 
2790 Daniel Gros, Global Welfare Implications of Carbon Border Taxes, September 2009 
 
2791 Louis N. Christofides, Michael Hoy and Ling Yang, The Gender Imbalance in 
Participation in Canadian Universities (1977-2005), September 2009 
 
2792 Jan K. Brueckner and Robert W. Helsley, Sprawl and Blight, September 2009  
2793 Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith, Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation, 
September 2009 
 
2794 John Beirne, Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas and Nicola 
Spagnolo, Global and Regional Spillovers in Emerging Stock Markets: A Multivariate 
GARCH-in-mean Analysis, September 2009 
 
2795 Rüdiger Pethig and Frieder Kolleß, Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition, 
Unemployment and Losses from Capital Market Integration, September 2009 
 
2796 Ngo Van Long, Horst Raff and Frank Stähler, Innovation and Trade with 
Heterogeneous Firms, September 2009 
 
2797 Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, Research Governance in Academia: Are there 
Alternatives to Academic Rankings?, September 2009 
 
2798 Thiess Buettner and Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an 
Automatic Stabilizer, September 2009 
 
2799 Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education, 
September 2009 
 
2800 Peter Friedrich, Chang Woon Nam and Janno Reiljan, Local Fiscal Equalization in 
Estonia: Is a Reform Necessary?, September 2009 
 
2801 Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek, State Ownership and Control in the Czech Republic, 
September 2009 
 
2802 Michael Stimmelmayr, Wage Inequality in Germany: Disentangling Demand and 
Supply Effects, September 2009 
 
2803 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Towards a Macroprudential Surveillance and Remedial Policy 
Formulation System for Monitoring Financial Crisis, September 2009 
 
2804 Margarita Katsimi, Sarantis Kalyvitis and Thomas Moutos, “Unwarranted” Wage 
Changes and the Return on Capital, September 2009 
 
2805 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, Aid, Growth and Devolution, September 
2009 
 
2806 Bas Jacobs and Dirk Schindler, On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce 
Moral Hazard in Social Insurance, September 2009 
 
2807 Hans Gersbach and Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Development, September 2009 
 
2808 David E. Wildasin, Fiscal Competition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and Capital: A 
Comparative Dynamic Analysis, September 2009 
 
2809 Johan Eyckmans and Cathrine Hagem, The European Union’s Potential for Strategic 
Emissions Trading through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts, September 2009  
2810 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, The Cross-section of Firms over the Business 
Cycle: New Facts and a DSGE Exploration, October 2009 
 
2811 Slobodan Djajić and Michael S. Michael, Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of 
the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach, October 2009 
 
2812 Devis Geron, Social Security Incidence under Uncertainty Assessing Italian Reforms, 
October 2009 
 
2813 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, Economic Nationalism and Economic 
Integration: The Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century, October 
2009 
 
2814 Emilia Simeonova, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Impact of Natural Disasters on 
Pregnancy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2815 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and 
Policy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2816 Sascha O. Becker, Erik Hornung and Ludger Woessmann, Catch Me If You Can: 
Education and Catch-up in the Industrial Revolution, October 2009 
 
2817 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Imports, Pass-Through, and the Structure of Retail 
Markets, October 2009 
 
2818 Paul De Grauwe and Daniel Gros, A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB, October 
2009 
 
2819 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Thouraya Hadj Amor and Christophe Rault, International 
Financial Integration and Real Exchange Rate Long-Run Dynamics in Emerging 
Countries: Some Panel Evidence, October 2009 
 
2820 Saša Žiković and Randall K. Filer, Hybrid Historical Simulation VaR and ES: 
Performance in Developed and Emerging Markets, October 2009 
 
2821 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, The Political Economy of Conscription, October 
2009 
 
2822 Steinar Holden and Åsa Rosén, Discrimination and Employment Protection, October 
2009 